Background of Jihadist radicalisation and measures for prevention and intervention in Switzerland by Eser Davolio, Mirjam




Background of Jihadist Radicalisation and Measures for Prevention and  
Intervention in Switzerland 
Miryam ESER DAVOLIO1 
ZHAW Soziale Arbeit 
Abstract 
This paper presents a development overview of prevention strategies in a federalist 
context. It builds on the results of the study on the backgrounds of jihadist radicali-
sation and the prevention strategies adopted in Switzerland (Eser Davolio and Re-
ther 2019) as well as the measures outlined in the Swiss National Action Plan to 
Prevent and Counter Radicalisation. The methodological approach comprises de-
scriptive quantitative data analyses of the different backgrounds of radicalisation 
and qualitative analyses of the prevention agencies and their strategies. This paper 
examines three such prevention and intervention agencies: counselling services, 
which have been set up in various cities and cantons for the universal and selective 
prevention of extremism in general and jihadist radicalisation in particular; com-
munity policing by the cantonal and municipal police; and, on the level of preven-
tion, the Swiss penal system facing radicalised persons in legal procedures and in 
prison. The prevention and intervention measures implemented by these agencies 
will be analysed, assessing whether they are adequate in view of the findings on the 
backgrounds of radicalisation. Focussing on jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland – 
a problem area with relatively limited evidence but at the same time of national se-
curity relevance – we have to consider the federalist context with its own challenges 
and aspects of interferences. 
Keywords:  Jihadist radicalisation, prevention, intervention 
Introduction 
Since 2013, the advent of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and in Iraq has caused an 
unprecedented global wave of jihadist radicalisation as well as an upsurge in terrorist attacks. 
These dynamics have also affected Europe. It is estimated that since the conflict broke out in 
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Syria, between 5000 and 7000 residents of Western European countries have gone abroad to 
join jihadi groups (Merz 2016). Furthermore, many European countries have also been target-
ed by terrorist attacks either directly perpetrated or inspired by IS. So far Switzerland has been 
spared such violent attacks. However, the wave of jihadist radicalisation that sweeps over the 
European continent has an impact on Switzerland. Up to now, the Swiss Federal Intelligence 
Service (FIS) has identified 77 individuals who have left Switzerland to join jihadist groups 
operating in Syria and Iraq (Merz and Saal 2019). In absolute terms, this number seems fairly 
small compared to other European countries (Eser Davolio et al. 2015). Per capita, however, 
this number places Switzerland at an only slightly lower rate than its neighbour Germany, and 
above Italy (Merz and Saal 2019:20). Additionally, in 2017 the Swiss authorities communicat-
ed that the Federal Intelligence Service was monitoring around 500 persons due to their 
online activity, i.e. the dissemination of content glorifying jihadist ideology or their contacts 
with such individuals. Furthermore, around 60 criminal proceedings related to terrorism have 
been instituted in the same year.  
Reacting to the dynamics, Switzerland published its first comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy in 2015.2 One of the main pillars of this strategy is the focus on the preventive dimen-
sion of counterterrorism, i.e., amongst others, on the prevention of radicalisation or on what 
is usually referred to as Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE). Due to Switzerland’s organisa-
tion as a federal state, the cantons and municipalities are responsible for the implementation 
of these PVE measures. In a federal system, the cantons have a certain autonomy and the fed-
eral government has restricted power to impose measures. As a result, the situation is quite 
heterogeneous, with cantons that have developed and implemented prevention agencies, and 
others that do not see the need for it or develop other forms of prevention measures. 
As a consequence, in 2016 the Swiss Security Network, a coordinating body for federal, 
cantonal and communal security policy actors, published a report looking at different 
measures aimed at the prevention of violent extremism implemented in the different cantons 
and municipalities in Switzerland. The aim of this report was to get an overview of the preven-
tion measures by the cantons and municipalities in view of creating a platform for knowledge 
transfer. Building on this, Switzerland then published its National Action Plan to Prevent and 
Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism at the end of 2017.3 This action plan outlines 
five areas of activities subdivided into 26 broader measures aimed not only at preventing vio-
lent extremism but also geared to encouraging disengagement and reintegration. 
In line with the measures proposed in the action plan,4 in 2018 a team of researchers from 
different Swiss Universities was tasked with updating a study on radicalisation that had been 
conducted in 2015 (Eser Davolio et al. 2015); the latter had explored the background of ji-
hadist radicalisation in Switzerland and made recommendations for prevention and interven-
tion. The new study (Eser Davolio et al. 2019) focuses on the background and the factors con-
tributing to radicalisation in the Swiss context and on the measures aimed at preventing vio-
lent extremism, namely the work of the different cantonal and municipal competence centres 
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for the prevention of violent extremism. It also deals with different community police initia-
tives aimed at preventing radicalisation as well as on the topic of radicalisation in the penal 
system. 
In the following, the findings of this study will be presented and discussed with the aim of 
evaluating whether the intervention and prevention measures are adequate to prevent jihadist 
radicalisation considering the background phenomena and taking into account the federalist 
context of Switzerland. 
Methodological approach 
The methodological approach comprises descriptive quantitative data analyses of the back-
grounds of radicalisation and qualitative analyses of the prevention agencies and their strate-
gies. The quantitative data on Islamic extremism in Switzerland was supplied by the FIS in 
2019 (Merz and Saal 2019), which was provided with a classification grid for this purpose. The 
variables defined in it can be divided into four larger groups: 1) socio-demographic infor-
mation, such as age, gender, relationship status, origin, place of residence, level of education 
and occupation;  2) social context and personality, such as family problems, use of drugs, psy-
chological abnormalities, criminality and experience of violence;  3) radicalisation factors, 
such as peer groups, the internet, missionary activities and contact with Salafist preachers; 4) 
jihadist activities, with particular emphasis on  jihadist-motivated travel. 
The sample includes 130 people in total. The FIS selected them from its priority cases of 
the past ten years (Merz and Saal 2019:10). The persons selected meet the following criteria: 
Their place of residence is or was in Switzerland. They can be assigned to the jihadist spec-
trum, either because they have engaged in violence or because they legitimised violence in the 
context of their ideological and religious beliefs. The individuals selected by the FIS are or 
were mainly high-risk persons.5 The only exception are a few older cases from back when the 
term was not yet used. The term does not include only violent extremists but also supporters 
and propagandists of jihadist groups, individuals who have come to the attention of the FIS 
due to jihadist-motivated travel as well as persons who have been identified due to indications 
of radicalisation, whether through internet activities or specific patterns of behaviour. 
More than half of the sample (55.4%) consists of cases of jihadist-motivated travellers. In 
addition to the 72 jihadist-motivated travellers (FIS 2018), nine persons whose departure was 
prevented are listed (6.9%). The other 49 radicalisation cases selected (36.7%) have no direct 
connection to jihadist-motivated travel. 
The data classification grid completed by the FIS is a list cumulatively compiled over the 
period of the last ten years and not a list of all persons currently under observation. Socio-
demographic variables and information on jihadist-motivated travel are provided in almost all 
cases. In contrast, we only have information on half or sometimes even fewer persons in the 
sample with respect to some variables of social context and radicalisation factors. Descriptive 
                                                     
5 The FIS uses the term high-risk persons to designate persons who “present an increased risk to Switzerland’s internal 
and external security.” They are determined “using a combination of very precise criteria where a specific connection to 
violence is the decisive factor” (Federal Intelligence Service 2018a). 
4 ESER DAVOLIO 
statistical methods, such as frequency distribution and averaging calculations, are used in the 
following analysis. 
For the qualitative analysis of prevention measures (Eser Davolio and Rether 2019), a total 
of 12 interviews were conducted with all ten extremism specialist units (Geneva, Lausanne, 
Biel, city of Berne, Basel-Stadt, Aargau, city of Zurich and canton of Zurich, Winterthur and 
Lugano). The interviews examine the existing personnel resources, the integration of the spe-
cialist unit, target groups, their consultation and case-work activities and their intervention 
strategies. For the analysis of the prevention strategies of community policing, a total of seven 
interviews were conducted with the existing specialist units in the cantons of Zurich, Berne, 
Fribourg and Schwyz, as well as in the cities of Zurich and Winterthur (ibid.). The semi-
structured interviews were carried out between August 2018 and January 2019. The analysis of 
the interviews focussed on the comparison of the specific approaches of the services in order 
to get an overview as well as insights into the interventions (without evaluating the effects of 
such interventions). 
In addition, qualitative interviews were conducted in order to analyse challenges of jihadist 
radicalisation in the Swiss penal system. There were two objectives: on the one hand, to pro-
vide information on the impact that the detention of radicalised persons (incarcerated for 
violating SR 122 and article 260ter SCC) has on the day-to-day running of prisons. On the 
other hand, the role of imams and Muslim chaplains in prison and their view on the phenom-
enon of radicalisation in Swiss prisons were examined (Schneuwly Purdie 2019). The sample 
of persons interviewed was compiled using a multifaceted approach. First, the prisons dealing 
with the incarceration of detainees suspected of violating SR 122 or article 260ter SCC were 
contacted. Second, the names of prisons faced with situations involving radical profiles were 
provided to us by the professionals interviewed. Third, the prison imams and Muslim chap-
lains were contacted. Finally, 15 persons performing various roles in 18 establishments in sev-
en different cantons (three in the French-speaking, four in the German-speaking area) were 
interviewed between December 2018 and February 2019 (ibid.). As the study was exploratory, 
the analysis of the interviews focused on the challenges the presence of radicalised inmates 
poses for day-to-day management (security, group dynamics, separation etc.) and prevention 
measures in order to get an overview of relevant issues in this context. 
The findings about the prevention and intervention measures in the Swiss penal system 
and advice centres will be discussed, assessing whether they are adequate in relation to the 
backgrounds of radicalisation, always considering the federalist context with its interferences. 
Findings 
Individual context of jihadist radicalisation 
Findings on individual factors of jihadist radicalisation in the Swiss context are presented in 
comparison to the findings obtained (Merz and Saal, 2019) on the issue in other European 
countries. 
The evaluation of the FIS data classification grid reveals the individual, psychosocial and 
socio-demographic backgrounds of persons classified as radicalised jihadists. Here, extensive 
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correlations with studies from neighbouring countries as Germany, Austria and France are 
observed, such as the fact that jihadist radicalisation mainly concerns males between 18 and 
35 who are second-generation immigrants,6 live in urban or suburban areas and tend to have a 
low level of education and to be poorly integrated into the employment market (Merz and 
Saal 2019). The fact that around 40% of the sample depend on state support (welfare benefits, 
unemployment benefits, disability insurance or refugee assistance) raises questions about so-
cietal alienation, the approaches of social work to these persons and their economic and social 
reintegration opportunities. It remains unclear if this dependency on state support started 
before their radicalisation or if it is the consequence of jail or other forms of exclusion. 
As observed in studies conducted in Germany (Bundeskriminalamt 2016), Italy (Marone 
and Vidino 2019) and France (Hecker 2018), it appears that the consumption of specific con-
tent on the internet plays an important supporting role in Switzerland, too. However, it is a 
sufficient sole criterion for radicalisation in only very few cases. Instead, group-dynamic fac-
tors of influence through like-minded peers and recruiters play a key role. This is contradicto-
ry to the position often expressed in public debate that Islam per se represents a radicalisation 
factor. As in other European countries, compared to the entire Muslim population the 20% of 
converts are overrepresented in the sample countries (Bundeskriminalamt 2016, Hecker 2018, 
Marone and Vidino 2019).7 Of the 34 cases of persons of the Muslim faith for which we have 
information regarding their family’s religious background, five persons grew up in secular 
family homes, 14 in liberal, eight in observant and only seven in fundamentalist (but not nec-
essarily jihadist) family homes. These results in the Swiss context correspond to the findings 
of other studies (e.g. Marone and Vidino 2019, Vergani et al. 2018), which consider familial 
religiousness not a central pull factor.  
Furthermore, the introduction to social interactions in the milieu of jihadists had a major 
influence on the radicalisation process of the sample They were primarily introduced by peers: 
during their radicalisation, 93 of 97 persons were influenced by people of the same age and 
from their personal environment. For most of the 45 persons for whom we have detailed 
information on the nature of these strong links, it was an individual friend (11) or even several 
friends (25). Finally, we can conclude that jihadist radicalisation and religious conversion are 
generally a long-term process and the phenomenon of blitz radicalisation is the exception; for 
72%, the process of radicalisation took over a year. The persons in question often experience 
personality changes during this process. This is due to the fact that they not only spend time 
with old and new social contacts in the radical milieu, but often also isolate themselves from 
friends, acquaintances and family members who do not share their new ideological 
convictions (Merz and Saal 2019). 
Switzerland is not an exception in terms of the proportion of radicalised persons in rela-
tion to its overall population (ratio per million). Its ratio lies at 9.2, similar to that in Germany 
(12.7), while Italy (2.9) has a lower and France (28.5), Austria (34.1) and Belgium (36.2) have 
higher rates (Merz and Saal 2019:18). Nevertheless, the radicalisation phenomenon has not 
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been as much a matter of public concern as in Germany, probably due to the fact that so far, 
no terrorist attack has been realised on Swiss territory. 
Structural answers to jihadist radicalisation 
This section of the paper presents measures of prevention and intervention on the federal and 
the cantonal level. On the federal level, the Swiss National Action Plan represents an im-
portant instrument. It offers guidelines for prevention and intervention regarding expertise 
through further education and research, the use of early detection instruments and the im-
provement of risk assessment and risk management procedures in prison, the prevention of 
extremist ideologies and groups, disengagement and reintegration as well as international 
cooperation. The measures regarding cooperation and coordination involve first, competence 
and advice centres for the issues of radicalisation and violent extremism, and, second, com-
munity policing.  While advice services are addressing at an individual level, community po-
licing points rather to the broader social level with an universal conceptualisation of preven-
tion. As Switzerland is a federalist nation, the guidelines of the National Plan are not binding 
for the cantons. They have the sovereignty to implement the recommendations. A participa-
tive process with these actors in the establishment of the National Plan is important in view of 
their long-term commitment. This democratic process needs time and can dilute initial goals 
and directives. However, once such a common ground is established, the probabilities of ac-
ceptance are increased and the implementation and funding responsibilities are determined. 
In the following, we present the measures adopted by advice centres, community policing and 
the penal system, which we analysed in the framework of our commissioned study (Eser 
Davolio et al. 2019). 
Advice Centres 
Early detection and counselling are key for the universal and selective prevention of jihadist 
radicalisation. Therefore, in line with other countries such as Germany (Said and Fuad 2018), 
France (Bouzar 2014) and Great Britain (RAN 2016), Switzerland seeks to address the prob-
lem through counselling centres and other measures. The development of quality guidelines 
for such prevention and disengagement work encompasses the following aspects: respect, 
credibility, building of trust, the absence of pressure, the promotion of emotional and social 
learning processes, and the focus on individual resources more than on deficits (Weilnböck 
and Uhlmann 2018, RAN 2016). From just two advice centres in 2015 in Zurich and Berne, 
the number of such counselling facilities has risen to ten centres in 2018, in cantons and cities 
concerned with jihadist radicalisation, such as Winterthur, Geneva, Lausanne, Biel, Berne, 
Basel, Lugano and (city and canton of) Zurich. They accepted counselling requests from can-
tons without any advice centres, even though they are supposed to focus on their respective 
areas. They offer advice to institutional actors (e.g. teachers, social workers and psychologists) 
and are required to respond to inquiries from the internal administration. 
What first emerged was the problem of the classification and evaluation of the phenomena 
of radicalisation. Where does radicalisation start, and at what point should intervention be 
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deemed necessary? Analogous questions arose regarding anticipatory measures and reporting 
processes, at what point of a suspicious case it is appropriate or obligatory to call in the police. 
This challenge also applies to potential actions by social workers: namely whether and to what 
extent they should call in the police when their clientele turns to them for assistance, and 
whether in doing so they are violating the professional code of practice with respect to action 
geared to an advocatory and protective approach. This concern arose less in communities 
where the cooperation between youth work and the police, in particular youth services,8 is 
already established and can build on experience in working closely together, since there is also 
a common understanding regarding the aims and possible counter-productive effects of inter-
ventions. One interviewee commented: 
With an expert group, in one case we made a triage and passed the case on to the 
police; the police then gave an all-clear signal. Idea exchange in the expert group is 
going well, we all know one another and have the same instinctive feeling. There, we 
discuss and agree on who will be involved with the case; otherwise we pass it on to 
the Expert Body Protection from Violence (Interview with advice centre, January 24 
2019).  
Similar questions regarding the prevention of radicalisation arose in connection with par-
ticularly vulnerable target groups, such as asylum seekers.  
The prevention goals and strategies are key conceptions taking into account the origins 
and causes of radicalisation processes. Here we can distinguish two fundamental perspectives. 
One investigates societal causal factors, such as discrimination, exclusion, lack of recognition 
and equal opportunities. The second looks into individual causes, such as deprivation, lack of 
integration, personal deficits, etc. (Van Bouchaute 2018). The recognition of societal root 
causes of radicalisation can cause problems even if both perspectives are taken into account. 
Counter-productive effects can crop up if strategies for the prevention of terrorism are em-
broiled in broader debates on Islam and integration. 
Community Policing 
Community policing strategies to prevent violent extremism aim at the establishment of trust 
between police and the communities through regular contact and exchange as well as integra-
tion (Spalek, Zahre McDonald and El Awa 2011). The sole focus on Muslim communities and 
security issues however bears the risk of reproducing negative stereotyping (Abbas 2018, 
Schenker et al. 2016). There are community policing services operational within Switzerland 
solely in four cantons and four cities (Eser Davolio et al. 2019). In seven interviews the actors 
responsible in this sector claimed that their main objective is to build trust in various commu-
nities, including Muslim organisations, other religious communities, and migrant associa-
tions. One of the principal tasks of such community policing is the realisation of information 
evenings in refugee centres that aim at diminishing the asylum seekers’ fear of the Swiss police 
and the distance between the parties involved. As universal prevention, contacts and exchange 
are improved in order to guarantee a better reciprocal understanding. The community polic-
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ing services maintain a network with other administrative key players and institutions with 
whom they exchange information and coordinate interventions. They give advice to the reli-
gious communities regarding security concepts and precautions, or they mediate quarrels in 
the neighbourhood. The communities appreciate this form of contact and reach out to the 
police agents when they are in need of assistance. In accordance with this give-and-take ap-
proach, the prevention of radicalisation becomes a common goal, and the willingness to as-
sume responsibility leads to a closer cooperation with the police (Ülger and Çelik 2018). 
In the context of extremism prevention, community policing has to distance itself from 
repressive functions of the police. For example, when there are police raids in certain 
mosques, the imam will call his contact person within community policing to obtain an ex-
planation. Vice-versa: communities can provide the police with information if they notice 
possible risk groups in proximity of their mosques. The effects of community policing are 
quite difficult to assess, as universal prevention is widespread and has a low threshold. 
The limits of community policing, for example its weak impact on religious discourses, are 
evident. Nevertheless, the bridge-building and networking activities can establish a basis for 
common interventions as well as interconnected social control and monitoring of the situa-
tion. 
In conclusion, we can state that advice centres and community policing represent low-
threshold local strategies for support and counselling to counter radicalisation and extremism. 
They are instituted when a certain level of concern in cities or cantons sensitises the authori-
ties for the need to allocate the necessary resources. Cantons and cities which are less con-
cerned by radicalisation phenomena will not establish such services. In this context, not only 
the recognition of the effective needs but also the problem awareness triggered by media re-
ports and public discussions play an important role. In the end, the combination of effective 
need, perceived need and political will leads to a very heterogeneous landscape of prevention 
measures. 
Penal system 
Prevention and intervention in the framework of jihadist radicalisation frequently concern 
legal procedures and detention. Prisons are a place where people face diverse vulnerabilities 
(emotional, psychological, physical, spiritual); negative thoughts, hate towards the broader 
society as well as group dynamics can promote radicalisation (Schneuwly-Purdie 2019). For 
this reason, the detention of radicalised detainee can – especially if they have some charisma - 
pose a risk for other rather labile detainees to be influenced by their ideas and a religious sense 
of mission. Prisons in Switzerland are also used to deal with diverse extremist groups such as 
Tamil Tigers, Grey Wolves, PKK and various exponents of organised crime. Therefore, they 
have developed their own strategies of separation in different sectors of the prison and cells, 
equipped with special monitoring. Most of the directors interviewed declared that they have 
everything under control as long as there are not more than two or three prisoners who have 
to be isolated. The directors, however, stated that they would be overburdened with five cases, 
as it would become difficult to really separate them from the other prisoners. Moreover, they 
pay special attention to radicalised detainees. Several prison directors interviewed noted that 
radicalised prisoners, especially intelligent ones, remain black boxes, i.e. they do not attract the 
  RADICALISATION 9 
guards’ attention and remain below the radar. The directors interviewed claimed that they 
provide further specific education for their guards to recognise such undercover behaviour. A 
prison chief of surveillance interviewed explained that he has found that co-prisoners resisted 
when a jihadist-motivated detainee sought to influence and missionize them. 
There have been cases of former right-wing extremists in Germany who as a result of posi-
tive encounters with foreigners in prison began to rethink their racist attitudes and sometimes 
even disengaged from extremism (Tramitz 2003). According to interviews conducted with 
right-wing extremists imprisoned in Germany, group dynamics reinforcing extremist atti-
tudes and group cohesion emerged when the number of extremists led to the forming of core 
groups or when the influence by extremist support groups from outside encouraged them to 
maintain and adhere to their ideology (Tramitz 2013). The findings of interviews conducted 
in the Swiss penal system revealed that the small number of radicalised inmates and solitary 
confinement serve to prevent such risks. On top of that the statements by prison directors and 
staff show that communication with radicalised prisoners poses a problem, since they general-
ly do not trust others. To them, prison staff represents the state. According to the prison di-
rectors, they only trust in Allah and this leads to difficulties in making contact and establish-
ing a relationship, especially considering that the prisoners remain convinced that their ac-
tions serve a higher purpose. 
As most of radicalised suspects are in pre-trial detention for an extended period due to the 
difficult and complex investigations (up to three years in some cases), no measures or thera-
pies are initiated. After their sentences, the final detention period corresponds to the duration 
of pre-trial detention and no further normal detention with possible measures follows 
(Schneuwly Purdie 2019). Since the sentences often do not recommend or prescribe probation 
assistance or therapies, no supporting measures take place after their release. These two condi-
tions – the long pre-trial detention and the sentences without probation assistance – are the 
main reasons for the complete lack of resocialisation and reintegration of radicalised detain-
ees. One of the prison directors stated that in cases of long pre-trail detention re-socialisation 
measures should be required to promote reintegration after a prisoner’s release. With a view 
to France and Great Britain, where such phenomena have been researched (Khosrokhavar 
2013, Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell 2013, Neumann 2010), this risk shows effects on organi-
sation within the jail. The contact between inmates during pre-trial detention is reduced to a 
minimum, since they are kept in solitary confinement. Some of the prison directors inter-
viewed who had radicalised suspects tried to make the pre-trial detention more bearable by 
allowing these individuals two daily walks in the courtyard, to do sport, or by providing lim-
ited work activities. 
In France, Mulhouse authorities are facing a substantial number of jihadist-motivated 
perpetrators and acknowledge the risks posed by the breeding ground that is prison. Munici-
pal authorities have started a radicalisation intervention programme that also involves judges. 
They suspend sentences for detention if the perpetrators agree to participate in an intensive 
intervention programme – if they refuse to cooperate, they have to go back to jail. The pro-
gramme is similar to the Danish Aarhus Reintegration Model (Bertelsen 2015), but contains 
some further elements such as restorative justice (e.g. contact and discussions with the victims 
of the Paris Bataclan attack), vocational guidance, psychological counselling, workshops on 
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conspiracy theories, socio-cultural coaching, etc. Such a multilateral programme does not aim 
at brainwashing, but those participating in the programme have to engage seriously and must 
show improvements. The suspended prison sentence puts pressure on the detainees. Other-
wise they would probably not agree to actively participate in the intervention programme. 
This means that the judges play a key role in the programme, and they monitor development 
of each participant regularly. Of course, it was the number of cases in Mulhouse that caused 
pressure to institute a disengagement programme: in March 2018, approximately sixty indi-
viduals were participating in it. Since this intervention project is not evidence-based and no 
other de-radicalisation programme with detainees has been scientifically evaluated (Beelmann 
2019:18), establishing effective intervention measures for prisons remains difficult. 
Since there have been neither approaches involving judges nor critical situations regarding 
the concentration of radicalised prisoners in the Swiss context up to now (see Schneuwly Pur-
die 2019), such mandatory intervention programmes are not yet possible. Given these circum-
stances, the prison wardens have to leverage the means at their disposal, and one such option 
are the Muslim chaplains within the jails. They come into contact with the Muslim prisoners 
who wish to participate in Friday prayers or to have individual contact with the imam. Find-
ings show that these Muslim chaplains establish quite confidential relationships with the in-
mates and gain insight into their religious way of thinking and interpretation of current events 
on a geopolitical level, e.g. their grievances against Western nations, etc. Sometimes they even 
obtain information about group dynamics. The information we gathered from the interviews 
with Muslim chaplains suggests that radicalised prisoners did not participate in Friday pray-
ers. Only one of them had an informal meeting with an imam. The imams interviewed noted 
that radicalised inmates consider them as traitors or spies, and consequently do not want to 
pray with them. The interviews with the imams show that they notice the underlying radical 
discourses of Muslim prisoners, as expressed in questions or claims about injustices in regard 
to their religion. The imams heard worrying statements after the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan 
attacks, such as well done, or they deserve it. In these situations, they stated, it is of fundamen-
tal importance for imams to be able to contest and clarify such discourses and accusations, 
and to argue with them about pretending to be “a real Muslim” (Schneuwly Purdie 2019:27). 
They agree that it is better to be neither neither naive nor alarmist but rather vigilant and to 
try, within the limits of their professional role inside the prison, to contribute to a moderate 
climate inside the institution. In recent years, they report to have noticed more frequent ques-
tions regarding geopolitics in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Afghanistan. This has motivated them 
to take the initiative by raising these topics in their Friday prayer sermons. One of the imams 
interviewed stated that he likes to vaccinate the prisoners against extremism in his sermons, in 
order to protect them from being manipulated by radicalised inmates. 
Discussion: Community-based prevention approaches in a federal system 
In comparison to other Western countries, on the Federal level, the answer to the challenges 
of jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland arrived relatively late. The National Action Plan to 
Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism was published in December 
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2017,9 almost two years later than in other European countries. Terrorist attacks, mainly in 
the years 2015 and 2016, had a catalysing effect on countries such as France, Belgium, Germa-
ny, and Great Britain, generating a call for national prevention strategies and action plans 
against extremism and terrorism. These national plans often juggle between repressive 
measures (law enforcement, security, police) on one hand, and prevention concerns and 
frameworks (education, welfare, integration) on the other. Terrorist violence is often seen as 
the logical result of a radicalisation process on a large scale, promoted by recruiters and 
preachers. Seen from this perspective, adolescents must be protected from contacts with dan-
gerous beliefs (Van Bouchaute 2018). 
Furthermore, there is little concrete evidence of jihadist activity in Switzerland. Therefore, 
the question emerges as to whether universal or also quite specific prevention measures are 
applicable to these few and hidden cases of home-grown perpetrators. On the other hand, 
there is considerable public attention paid to jihadism, especially if violent jihadist incidents 
occur in European countries, raising questions regarding how to face jihadist travellers and 
returnees. Moreover, serious thought must be given to the possible collateral damage that pre-
vention measures directed toward the Muslim communities can cause when these measures 
implicitly blame communities for being breeding grounds. This discourse construes the entire 
minority as a potentially suspect community. Especially religious Muslims and mosques are 
gaining the increased attention of the police, local authorities and prevention agents. Muslim 
youth and women in particular are often made the subject of discussions on integration and 
the relationship between Islam and Western societies. The discourses regarding the topic of 
jihadism are a melange of diverse discourses on integration, parallel societies, fundamentalism 
and Salafism, violence, security and control, etc. Media reports on Muslim communities and 
mosques have been largely shaped and defined by the problem of radicalisation in recent years 
(Schneuwly Purdie and Tunger-Zanetti 2014). These circumstances have an impact on pre-
vention and intervention programmes and on the cooperation with Muslim organisations, 
and thus must be carefully reflected upon. 
The effects of the National Action Plan against extremism on the structural level depends 
on the priorities and resources of a canton to implement the recommendations in practice. 
Especially small, rural cantons feel little concern about jihadist radicalisation. Additionally, 
the effort to establish specific services would disproportionately strain their economic re-
sources. In our view, to tackle the limited number of jihadist radicalisation cases in Switzer-
land, centralistic strategies with federal structures might be more appropriate. However, the 
cantons have clear reservations about handing over competences to the federal level of gov-
ernance. Given that adequate language competencies and local knowledge are highly relevant 
for effective counselling (Eser Davolio et al. 2015), at least three advise centres, one each for 
German, French and Italian speaking regions, is needed. 
A consequence of such fragmentary implementation on the cantonal and municipal level 
is the risk of independent parallel structures lacking exchange and intercommunication. In 
light of that, one of the benefits of the research conducted (Eser Davolio et al. 2019) is the 
                                                     
9 Swiss Security Network 2017. 
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overview and analysis of the federalist implementation in the cantons and cities concerned as 
well as of the cases and situations the respective services encountered. 
Conclusions: The different backgrounds of jihadist radicalisation and preven-
tion and intervention agencies 
The findings on the different backgrounds of jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland correspond 
to risk factors in other European countries (Hecker 2018, Marone and Vidino 2019). This 
shows that Switzerland does not represent a special case. Regarding intervention and preven-
tion of radicalisation in the penal system – in light of the possibilities, with jails that are not 
overcrowded as is the case in many other European countries – it seems easier to keep possi-
ble negative group dynamics or recruitment in prison under control than elsewhere. However, 
there is a complete lack of disengagement programmes for individuals in jail as well as after 
their release. Because of that, prevention strategies in the framework of the Swiss Penal System 
cannot be considered to be sufficient. 
Universal prevention agencies, such as advice centres and community policing, offer in-
formation and low-threshold counselling as well as case management to address radicalisation 
at an early stage and to build up mutual trust. For example, conversions represent a risk fac-
tor, and alarmed parents, friends or teachers can ask for advice and counselling to assess 
whether it is a harmless conversion or possibly a risky case. When questions about such indi-
vidual developments emerge, it is important that the counselling is low-threshold and can be 
provided anonymously. Both existing prevention agencies however focus on universal preven-
tion and therefore use rather broad strategies addressing the topic. 
Considering the findings on risk factors for jihadist radicalisation, it seems obvious to seek 
to intervene at an early stage of radicalisation. As soon as relatives and peers perceive radical 
changes in an individual, counselling and assistance must be provided. Additionally, it is cru-
cial to raise awareness among actors on the social level, such as mosques, and to strengthen 
cooperation in order to agree on at least a minimal consensus regarding common prevention 
strategies. Even though the research findings do not indicate mosques to be frequent promot-
ers of radicalisation (Eser Davolio et al. 2019), they are key for early detection and prevention. 
For this reason, we think that advice centres and community policing seem to be most suitable 
for prevention. 
Moreover, the two prevention agencies are in contact with other key actors and experts 
and function as a link; they inform and sensitise other actors and make case management eas-
ier. This link is missing in cantons without prevention agencies. Thus, the federal system leads 
to a disparity between cantons with regard to measures taken against jihadist radicalisation.10 
The other cantons represent blind spots on the Swiss map of prevention work. This calls for 
the development of a transfer strategy from better equipped and experienced cantons to those 
with fewer resources and services. Furthermore, the creation of a national prevention centre 
which coordinates measures, organises the exchange of experience of and for practitioners 
                                                     
10 Often the advice centers offered assistance to citizens of other cantons, although they technically would not have been 
allowed to. 
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and promotes the evaluation of prevention strategies in order to develop evidence-based 
measures would be an important step towards more effective prevention programmes. 
Apart from the constructive effects of prevention measures, it is also important to have a 
look at their possible counter-productive or stigmatising effects. Both intervention agencies – 
the advice centres and community policing – are not directed uniquely towards Muslims, but 
towards a broad spectrum of possible target groups: advice centres cover all kinds of extrem-
ism, some of them also various forms of religious fundamentalism, including sects. Commu-
nity policing is directed toward various religious communities. But because of the hype about 
jihadist radicalisation, both agencies started focusing solely on the Muslim target group.  
However, both prevention agencies distance themselves from modes of repression and try to 
build up trust and cooperation with their respective target groups, thereby partly avoiding the 
risk of blaming and stigmatisation of the Muslim community in Switzerland. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that intervention and prevention strategies in a federal sys-
tem like Switzerland do not provide general and standardised offers and measures for the 
whole territory. They are, however, quite adequate for preventing and countering radicalisa-
tion at an early stage. Intervention measures for manifest forms of an advanced stage of radi-
calisation, such as in the penal system, are still lacking. 
Finally, the question of whether the prevention and intervention measures are adequate in 
relation to our findings on the backgrounds of radicalisation can only be answered partly 
within the framework of this article. On one hand, advice centres and community policing are 
restricted to some areas and operate merely on a universal and selective prevention level. For 
this reason, their approaches remain quite general and low-level. On the other hand, we can 
state that the advice centres operating as prevention agencies offer services in urban areas, 
which have been seriously concerned about jihadist radicalisation. Thus, they take action 
where a major need for counselling operating on an individual level exists. At the same time, 
the community policing tries to build up trust with the Muslim minority and promote coop-
eration. This diminishes possible negative effects like the increase of polarisation within socie-
ty. In the light of this, the two prevention agencies, advice centres and community policing, 
are operating in complementarity on two different levels, cooperating with the security sector 
when necessary. 
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